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dence to Alan de Brauw at alan.d.debrauw@williams.edu.Seasonal Migration and Improving Living Standards in Vietnam
Since the implementation of Doi Moi, the economic reform begun in 1986, Vietnam
has been one of most remarkable economic success stories in the world. Economic growth
has been rapid, the country has brought its international trade into balance, and it has elim-
inated budget deﬁcits that caused rapid inﬂation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
Vietnam’s microeconomic performance has arguably been just as good as its macroeco-
nomic performance. Living standards have increased in both urban and rural areas, and
poverty has declined dramatically (Glewwe).
Although living standards have been increasing and poverty has been declining since
Doi Moi began, it does not necessarily follow that Vietnam’s people are uniformly bet-
ter off. The increase in living standards has not been uniform across or within regions
(Benjamin and Brandt). Although the poverty headcount rate declined from 58% to 37%
between 1992 and 1997, some regions of Vietnam (the Northwest and the Central High-
lands) still have poverty headcounts of over 70% (Minot and Baulch). As of 2002, 23% of
the population still lacked access to clean water and 35% of children under ﬁve suffered
from malnutrition.
Benjamin and Brandt ﬁnd that rural-urban income inequality increased between 1992
and 1997, and ﬁnd that by 1997, average income levels in rural areas are roughly half of
those in urban areas. As the rural-urban income gap grows, one would expect to see in-
creasing migration from rural to urban areas (Harris and Todaro). In Vietnam, however,
landtakesonanadditionalvalue, primarilyduetoalackofwell-functioningmarkets(Ray).
In the similar setting of China, researchers have not observed many whole families migrat-
ing, as they continue to work the land partially due to fear of expropriation (Brandt et al.).
One might expect to observe a similar pattern in Vietnam, where land rights are similarly
tenuous. Moreover, households aware of higher wages and living standards in urban areas
might decide to use migration as part of a household level development strategy (Stark).
Seasonal migration may play an important role in such strategies for some households, yet
it has received little attention in the literature on Vietnam.
1In this paper, we plan to document the effects of seasonal migration on household
well-being, as measured by annual household expenditures. Our paper is not the ﬁrst to de-
scribe the determinants of household expenditures in Vietnam, though it is the ﬁrst to study
migration. Glewwe, Gragnolati, and Zaman described determinants of household expen-
ditures, primarily in sequential cross-sections of households, but also in the panel we use.
However, their analysis does not include variables that could be considered endogenous,
such as migration or other variables. We extend their analysis to explore the effects of sea-
sonal migration on household expenditures in rural Vietnam. To do so, we use instrumental
variables and panel data techniques. We make two speciﬁc contributions to the literature.
First, we are able to describe which parts of the initial expenditure distribution are more
likely to participate in migration. Second, we document patterns of migration in Vietnam
over the course of the 1990s, and extend the literature on Vietnam to understanding the
effects of migration on its microeconomy. If households participating in migration are able
to increase incomes, policy makers interested in targeting poorer areas may want to design
policies that encourage seasonal migration.
Our study has three primary objectives. First, we document the rapid increase of
seasonal migration in Vietnam over the course of the 1990s. Second, we will analyze the
effects of seasonal migration on household consumption growth, using a model similar to
a household level growth model (Islam). After determining a range of values for the effect
of migration on household expenditures, we run a counterfactual experiment, like the one
conducted by Barham and Boucher, to analyze how participation in seasonal migration has
affected the poverty rate and inequality statistics between the two surveys.
The paper will meet these objectives as follows. The ﬁrst section will describe the
data set we will use in the analysis. The second section will further review the literature
on Vietnam’s economy and will describe changes in both household expenditures and mi-
gration over time. The third section will introduce our methods of analysis, and the fourth
section will present our results. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.
2Data
The data for this study was obtained from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS),
conducted in 1992-93 and in 1997-98 by the World Bank in collaboration with the Vietnam
State Planning Committee and the General Statistical Ofﬁce. The VLSS is a comprehensive
nationwide survey consisting of two main parts: a household survey and a commune-level
survey. The household survey collected information on various aspects of living condi-
tions, including individual-level health, education, off-farm employment, on-farm labor,
and migration, as well as household demographics, housing conditions, family expendi-
tures, income sources, and credit access. We use a special module asked both in 1992 and
1997 about seasonal migration to investigate migration behavior by households. To mea-
sure household well-being, we follow Deaton and use per capita household expenditures.
Total household expenditures are calculated by summing up the consumption expenditures
on food, home-produced food, nondurable and nonfood goods, the estimated rental value of
durable goods, the estimated rental value of the dwelling, and the value of in-kind transfers
from off-farm employers.
The household survey was accompanied by a commune-level survey, which provides
further information on local living conditions. In particular, we use information on the
proportion of the village workforce that was migrating in 1992. The commune survey also
provides information on various facilities and activities in the commune, such as health
facilities, schools, agricultural practices, and market access.
The two surveys in 1992-3 and 1997-8 have signiﬁcantly different sample sizes and
geographic compositions.1 The sample of 4799 households in the 1992 survey was chosen
to be nationally representative, but the 6000 households in the 1997 survey include over ﬁf-
teen hundred households that were added from the 1995 Multi-Purpose Household Survey
to replace the households that were not tracked from the 1992 survey.
For this study, we construct a panel of the 3492 rural households included in both
surveys. Since we are interested in behavior over the course of time, we must pay atten-
tion to the households dropped from the rural sample. 344 households, or almost 10% of
3the rural sample in 1992 were not resurveyed in 1997, which raises the concern that the
dropped households were systematically different than the panel households.2 To assuage
these concerns, we analyzed the geographic distribution of those households, the expendi-
ture per capita levels, and the food share in expenditures. Although they were somewhat
better off at the mean, at the median the per-capita expenditures in 1992 were nearly iden-
tical (1510 thousand dong for dropped households versus 1506 thousand dong for included
households).3 Still, we might assume that the missing households were slightly better off
in 1992 as a group than panel households. Since migrant households tend to come from
the lower part of the expenditure distribution, the missing households will not profoundly
affect our main regression results. However, we may understate expenditure inequality in
the later period and therefore the results of our poverty and inequality simulation may be
affected slightly, as we may understate the upper end of the distribution.
Economic Reform in Vietnam in the 1990s
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy accelerated in many ways during the 1990s. The
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 may have been a catalyst for these reforms. Vietnam
had been ﬁscally dependent on Soviet aid, but had been forced to invest in heavy industry
and to sell products back to the Soviet Union (Dollar and Litvack). The immediate halt in
Soviet aid may have spurred Vietnam to open its economy to foreigners and to make several
new reforms, including liberalization in agriculture that included a change to an individual
farming system.
In rural Vietnam, several reforms are known to have increased well-being. As mar-
kets became increasingly open during the early 1990s, agricultural growth accelerated,
and Vietnam became the second largest rice exporter in the world. Output growth in rice
and other agricultural products can be attributed to the liberalization of fertilizer markets,
which reduced input costs; the liberalization of output markets, which increased prices
and exports; and the expansion of the individual household farming system. While output
increased across the country, the disparity between the North and the South continued to in-
4crease in the 1990s. Although the price of fertilizer fell in both the North and the South, the
producer price of rice increased more in the South, encouraging higher production there.
Because rice farmers in the South were more efﬁcient than the rice farmers in the North,
production in the North shifted from rice to other agricultural products. The diversiﬁca-
tion of agricultural production became possible because internal trade barriers between the
North and the South were completely removed by the early 1990s. Rice could ﬂow from
the South to the North, which had not occurred before. As a result, growing agricultural
output beneﬁted farmers in both regions (Benjamin and Brandt).
The enactment of the new Land Law of 1993 further improved the performance of the
rural sector during the 1990s. Under this law, land tenure was extended to twenty years or
more, and the government allowed transfers of land-use rights. Although the government
continued to own the land, the longer lease period provided farmers land security and en-
couraged them to invest in their land productivity. In theory, the establishment of land-use
rights would enable transfers from inefﬁcient to efﬁcient users and encourage inefﬁcient
farmers to work off-farm. Although Ravallion and Van der Walle estimate that only one
third of the initial inefﬁciency has been eliminated through land-use right transfers between
1992 and 1997, Deininger and Jin suggest that smaller landowners have greater access to
land, because relatively rich people are selling their land and moving off-farm to increase
their earnings. One can conclude that the combination of recently improved land rights and
more robust off-farm labor markets have contributed to improved household welfare.
Measuring the Increase in Household Expenditures
The household expenditure data indicate that economic growth in Vietnam translated to
increased living standards for most rural households. Whereas the median per capita ex-
penditure level was 1506 thousand dong in 1992, by 1997 median household per capita
expenditures had increased to 2015 thousand dong, or by 33%. Although many transition
countries have experienced increased inequality along with economic growth, descriptive
statistics on relative inequality in Vietnam show little change. The Gini ratio for household
5per capita expenditures was 26.9 in 1992, and only increased to 28.0 in 1997. When consid-
ering Vietnam’s rural households, it seems that households in Vietnam have become better
off without experiencing the expected increase in inequality for its level of development
(Kuznets).
However, we cannot and should not assume that each household has maintained the
same position in the income distribution between 1992 and 1997. Rather, some households
will have beneﬁted more than others. To assess how different households have fared over





where pcexp represents per-capita expenditures, and t is the time between surveys. We
ﬁnd that expenditures in some households have grown much faster than average, whereas
others have grown slower (Figure 1). The kernel density of expenditure growth rates has a
relatively smooth distribution.4 The mean household’s expenditures grow by 5.8% over the
sample period, but roughly one-ﬁfth of households experience consumption declines over
the study period.
Since we are not only interested in ascertaining the effect of migration on living stan-
dards, but also how migration affects a household’s position in the income distribution, we
create categories for performers and non-performers over the study period. We consider the
873 households in the top quartile of the growth rate distribution to be performers, and we
consider the 873 households with growth rates in the lowest quartile to be non-performers.
The growth rates are somewhat negatively correlated with expenditures per capita in 1992
(ρ = −0.41), so faster growing households tend to come from the lower end of the 1992-3
expenditure distribution. Although our cutoffs are relatively arbitrary, they correspond well
to households with extremely fast growth rates and households with stagnant or declining
consumption. The 75th percentile of the distribution is 11.0%, and the 25th percentile is
0.4%, which implies that performers have seen their aggregate expenditures rise by 75%
or more, and most of the households in the non-performers category have actually had
6expenditures decrease.5 Therefore, the non-performer category includes households that
policy makers might be particularly interested in helping gain from improving national
living standards.
Seasonal Migration in Vietnam
The VLSS show that from a very small base, seasonal migration has increased nearly six-
fold between 1992 and 1997. We deﬁne seasonal migrants as any migrants who left the
household for part of the year to work, but returned to the household.6 Typically, these mi-
grants indicated that they were away between busy seasons on the farm. The data indicate
that the destination for a sizeable proportion of seasonal migrants is either Hanoi or Ho Chi
Minh City; over 1
3 of the migrants in 1997 migrate to one of the two big cities. We will use
this fact in one of our identiﬁcation strategies.
Seasonal migrants in Vietnam share characteristics with migrants from other coun-
tries (Table 1). Migrants are typically young, relatively well-educated men when compared
with the rest of the rural population (rows 1 through 3). For example, the average migrant in
the sample has 6.8 years of education, while non-migrants have an average of 5.9 years of
schooling. These results are similar to early studies of migrants in China (e.g. Zhao). Mi-
grants in 1997 are about twice as likely as others to have some sort of skill training as well.
In general, migrants are often members of households with a relatively large endowment
of human capital.
When we characterize households as either migrant households, which are house-
holdsthathaveincreasedparticipationinmigrationbetween1992and1997, ornon-migrant
households, we also ﬁnd differences in descriptive statistics (Table 2).7 Households with
migrants living in them in both 1992 and 1997 in general have lower per-capita expenditure
levels than the sample mean (1740 thousand dong in 1997). However, migrant households
in general seem to have grown a bit faster than other households, as the growth rate was
6.3% for migrant households versus 5.7% in others. This difference is small, but might
matter for poor households; more of the migrant households were below the World Bank’s
7poverty line for Vietnam in 1992. Furthermore, these ﬁgures do not account for other dif-
ferences between migrant and other households. For example, migrant households tend to
be a bit larger than other households. The average migrant household has 5.4 members,
versus 5 members for other households. In the results section, we will control for such
household level differences.
Households may participate in seasonal migration, or desire to participate in seasonal
migration, for a number of reasons. First, individuals within households may be able to
earn higher wages in urban areas than rural areas, particularly if rural-urban inequality is
increasing. Harris and Todaro showed that labor mobility is determined by employment
rate and wage differentials between cities and villages. In theory, workers keep moving
to high-wage and/or low-unemployment locations until a wage-unemployment equilibrium
is reached. The equilibrum is economically efﬁcient; thus, as transportation costs and
information asymmetry diminish in developing countries, a large proportion of the rural
population migrates to urban areas.
However, Harris and Todaro’s model leave out many other important factors, and
models migration as an individual rather than a household decision. Stark suggests that
migration decisions are far more complex. Households in developing countries may send
out migrants in order to alleviate economic constraints on households, such as the lack
of good credit or insurance markets. Migrants can alleviate credit constraints by bringing
home savings from their time away, allowing households either to invest in agricultural or
other home production (Taylor and Martin). However, there is a possible cost to migration.
If migrants are absent from the household at important points in the agricultural production
cycle, there may also be a negative, lost labor effect on household income or consumption
(Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw).
Migration may not just be costly in terms of production, but households may face
other costs that hinder their migration behavior. For example, moving costs may be high
for some households, particularly if information in the village about jobs in the city do not
exist. Information about jobs often ﬂows through migrant networks (e.g. Massey et al.).
8Munshi shows that network quality, meaning the quality of the information ﬂowing through
the network, is affected by the weather in Mexico. Mexico, though, is a mature migrant
source; international migrants have gone from Mexico to the United States seasonally for
years. Since weather information is largely unavailable for Vietnam, this instrument is
unavailable.
Identifying Migration
Our identiﬁcation strategy therefore is to measure two different types of networks that
rural Vietnamese households may use to ﬁnd employment away from the village. First,
we consider the seasonal migration network that had occurred at the commune level in
1992 as a potential instrument. This instrument has been used in the literature before (e.g.
Taylor et al., Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw), but may suffer from several drawbacks.
Network quality could be affected by the weather in previous years. Since the networks
in Vietnam are relatively new, it is unlikely that the weather has much of an effect on
migration network quality. On the other hand, it could be that communities that were early
to participate in migration were also likely to grow faster in general, and then our measure
of the migration network would be more correlated with growth. To attempt to solve this
potential problem, we will include a measure of commune level expenditures in 1992 (the
average expenditures in 1992 in the commune, not including the household in question) and
the log per-capita expenditures in 1992 in several of our regressions, as commonly done in
the cross-country growth literature to test for convergence.8
Second, we will use an approach unique to Vietnam to deﬁne a second set of migra-
tion network variables. In Vietnam, many people living in communes were not born there.
In the 1997-8 VLSS, 23% of people were born outside of their home commune (Lucas).
After the war ended, veterans were in some cases assigned to communes and other people
were forcibly relocated to rural areas. People who served in the war or were forcibly re-
located, prior to a period in which people did not move around (e.g. until Doi Moi began)
have contacts elsewhere but cannot have used those contacts for well-being until reforms
9began. We create two measures of the availability of such contacts to households. First,
we count the number of people who were born or had lived in either Ho Chi Minh City or
Hanoi in each household, prior to 1975. These people would be more likely than others
to have contacts in either city, making them or members of their family particularly good
candidates to move to one of those two cities. Second, we count the people who were ei-
ther in the army or were forcibly relocated after the war in each household, as those people
would potentially have contacts outside the commune that could potetially lead to jobs. We
express both variables as a percentage of household members. Neither of these variables
should be correlated with growth, though they could be correlated with migration behavior.
The aggregate number of households in the panel sending out seasonal migrants in-
creases from 65 in 1992 to 369 in 1997 (Table 3). We ﬁnd that migrant households are
generally from communes with speciﬁc geographic characteristics. In 1997, over 20% of
households in coastal areas and “hills/midlands” had at least one seasonal migrant in 1997
(rows 4 and 6). In contrast, few migrants left high mountainous areas; only 2.4% of rural
households had a migrant in 1997. The lack of mobility in high mountainous areas is likely
due to underdeveloped transportation networks and limited off-farm employment oppor-
tunities. Thus, the typical household with migrants can be characterized as a relatively
poor household that reside in lower lying areas, and therefore may have more developed
networks through which to migrate.
Empirical Strategy
We are interested in understanding the effect of migration on household per-capita expendi-
tures. However, we are concerned that unobservable factors about the household that affect
its expenditures may also be correlated with its propensity to migrate, which would bias an
OLS coefﬁcient estimate relating migration to household expenditures. Therefore, in our
analysis we must be concerned about controlling for exogenous factors at the household
level.
Using panel data allows us to difference out any time invariant effects at the house-
10hold level that might affect both migration behavior and expenditures. We use a differenced
estimator in all of our regressions, which means that we estimate the effect of the differ-
ence in migration behavior on the expenditure growth rate, our dependent variable. The
estimator can be written as:
rhc = δ1997 + β∆Mhc + γ∆Zhc + ∆εhc (2)
where r represents the growth rate of household h in commune c, M represents migration,
Z represents other factors that inﬂuence growth, and ε is an error term assumed mean
zero and independently distributed across communes, though we allow correlation within
communes through clustered standard errors. In all speciﬁcations, Z includes household
demographic variables, including the number of elderly men and women, the number of
working age men and women, and the number of school age children as regressors.
We are concerned that several of the other regressors we might add to equation (2)
may be endogenous to the growth process, although their inclusion would not bias our
estimate of β, the effect of migration on household expenditure growth. Therefore we
experiment with including them in some speciﬁcations but not others. The two main sets
of variables are we call a human capital set and a cross community growth set. The human
capital set includes changes in the logarithm of the household size as well as changes in
the average schooling level of the household workforce. The cross community growth
variables include the household expenditure level in 1992 and the average community level
expenditures in 1992 (leaving out the observed household). The latter set of variables are
similar to those used by Dercon to study cross-community growth in Ethiopia.
Thesecondspeciﬁcationincludingthecrosscommunitygrowthvariablescanbewrit-
ten:
rhc = δ1997 + β∆Mhc + γcX92,c + γxX92,hc + γ∆Zhc + ∆εhc (3)
Although the initial expenditure variables may not be exogenous, they can be used for
two purposes. Although a negative γc will not imply convergence as we only have two
periods, a rejection of the null hypothesis that γx = γc would imply that convergence within
11and between communities is occurring at different speeds (Dercon). Second and more
importantly, the inclusion of these variables helps control for differences in wealth levels
across communities, strengthening our argument about the exogeneity of the commune
network variable.
Finally, we are interested in knowing which part of the 1992 expenditure distribution
was affected by later migration behavior, and how poverty and inequality has been affected
as a result of increasing migration. We employ two procedures to understand these effects.
First, we test whether or not migrant households are more likely to be categorized as per-
formers or non-performers, based on the deﬁnitions above. We take a slightly different
approach to these regressions. We use a probit model, so we cannot include household
ﬁxed effects (Wooldridge). Therefore we include a set of explanatory variables measured
in 1992. We include several variables that help control for differences in wealth and capital
levels across households and communities, including the age of the household head and its
square, landholdings, and commune dummy variables for whether or not a factory existed
in 1989, whether or not there was a crop failure in 1992, whether or not there was a sec-
ondary school, whether or not a road was built between surveys, and whether or not new
communal agricultural investments had been made. In the probit regressions, we still have
the problem of an endogenous migration variable, so we use an instrumental variable probit
regression developed by Newey.
Second, after estimation we perform a counterfactual experiment to understand how
poverty and inequality statistics have been affected by migration. We remove the estimated
effect of migration from the household growth rates, and compute what 1997 expenditures
would have been for those households particpating in migration in 1997. We then recom-
pute some basic statistics that describe poverty and inequality, such as the headcount and
the Gini ratio. Since relatively few households have sent out migrants by 1997, we do not
expect to see large effects, but they should indicate at least the trend.
12Estimation and Results
We estimated equation (2) using OLS and instrumental variables, using different sets of
instruments in different speciﬁcations (Table 4).9 Not surprisingly, when we use OLS to
estimate the effect of migration on expenditure growth, we ﬁnd no statistical relationship
(column 1, row 1). Given that unobservables that likely affect expenditure growth also
affect the propensity to migrate, the OLS regression is likely to be biased. Indeed, we reject
the null hypothesis that migration is exogenous through a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.10
Our ﬁrst stage regression indicates that two of our three instruments are strongly
correlatedwiththemigrationvariable(AppendixTable2). Thecommunenetworkvariable,
the percent of the commune workforce that migrated in 1992, and one of the alternative
network variables, the percent of the household that had lived in either Hanoi or Ho Chi
Minh City, both have signiﬁcant, positive effects on the number of household migrants,
no matter the speciﬁcation (rows 1 and 2). Though both estimated effects are positive,
the effect of the commune network variable is larger in magnitude. The percent of the
household relocated is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations (row 3).
When we instrument for migration in the second stage, we ﬁnd that migration always
has a positive effect on expenditure growth. However, the statistical signiﬁcance of the
coefﬁcient depends upon the set of instruments used and assumptions about growth across
regions (Table 4). When regional dummy variables are not included (columns 2 through
4), the migration coefﬁcient is only marginally signiﬁcant when we include all three instru-
ments (column 4). Otherwise, it is insigniﬁcant. Since we can interpret the constant as the
baseline growth in this model, this model implies that baseline expenditure growth rates
should be the same in all regions. If baseline growth is not constant across communities
or regions, we are omitting important variables from the analysis. We relax this restriction
by adding regional dummy variables to the analysis and ﬁnd that the number of migrants
variable becomes statistically signiﬁcant in speciﬁcations (5) and (7). We ﬁnd that an ad-
ditional migrant leads to a 6.3% or 5.3% higher growth rate, respectively. Although the
latent network variables seem to assist the community migration variable in identiﬁcation,
13the effect is small and statistically insigniﬁcant when we use them alone (column 6). Since
we argue below that the community network is not affected by community wealth, and the
model is not overidentiﬁed when all instruments are included, we prefer the speciﬁcation
with the largest instrument set (5.3%; column 7).
Because we use the community network variable in our identiﬁcation strategy, we
are concerned that community wealth or well-being may affect our instruments. Therefore,
we add both our set of human capital variables and the initial expenditure levels to the
model (Table 5). When we add education and household size to the model, many of our
coefﬁcients take on expected signs and signiﬁcance levels (column 1). They do not affect
our estimate for migration behavior; we ﬁnd that an additional migrant increases household
per-capita expenditures by 4.8%, ceteris paribus (row 1). Additional adult members of the
household are likely to participate in agriculture in rural Vietnam, which leads to higher
household incomes and expenditures. The number of children between 6 and 17 also has
a positive signiﬁcant impact on household expenditure growth, but this effect is not due to
additional work performed. Rather, it is likely that more children went to school by 1997
than in 1992, and the increase in expenditures partially reﬂects the increase in school en-
rollment rates. Using the same data set, Nguyen ﬁnds that the primary school enrollment
rate has increased by 10 percentage points for the poorest expenditure quintile. Controlling
for demographics, changes in household size has a negative effect on the per capita expen-
diture growth rate. This result may reﬂect economies of scale in food consumption, which
is the largest share in the household budget (Deaton and Paxson).
When we add the 1992 expenditure level to the model (Table 5, column 2), we ﬁnd
a negative and signﬁciant coefﬁcient on 1992 expenditures (−0.074) and a positive, signif-
icant coefﬁcient on migrants (0.075). If we believe the former coefﬁcient, it implies that
household expenditures are exhbiting mean reversion in Vietnam, consistent with the corre-
lation between initial expenditure levels and growth. Mean reversion implies at least static
inequality, whereas at Vietnam’s level of GDP, according to the Kuznets hypothesis we
would expect to see increasing inequality. Regardless, the inclusion of initial expenditures
14actually increases our migration coefﬁcient, and it remains statistically signiﬁcant.
When we include the initial commune level expenditure levels as well (Table 5, col-
umn 3), we still ﬁnd a positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the number of migrants (0.069).
So adding initial wealth levels does not affect the signiﬁcance of the migration coefﬁcient,
strengthening our belief in the community level instrument. The coefﬁcient on the average
expenditures variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, implying that wealthier com-
munities have grown at faster rates, ceteris paribus. Because the household expenditures
and the average community expenditures have statistically different coefﬁcients, it seems
that convergence is taking place at different rates across communes and households.
Across almost all of our models that use instrumental variables, we ﬁnd that an ad-
ditional seasonal migrant implies a growth rate that is between 4.8% and 7.5% faster than
a household that does not participate in migration, and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant
in most of our regressions. The results imply that households able to participate in mi-
gration in rural Vietnam have grown much faster than households that have not, holding
other variables and non-time varying effects constant. As discussed earlier, it could be that
these households participate in migration because wages are higher outside the village, or
because they are able to relax constraints on household production, which leads to higher
incomes and therefore consumption. With this test, we cannot discern between these two
explanations.
Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with Stark’s theory of migration, rather than Har-
ris and Todaro. If the Harris-Todaro model completely characterized migration, it is unclear
why there would be seasonal migration in the ﬁrst place, particularly given the presence of
moving costs. People might be responding to wage ﬂuctuations, but then there is no reason
that household expenditures would increase upon the migrant’s return, according to Harris
and Todaro; the migrant would add to household production potentially at the rural wage,
but no more. So it is more likely that households are participating in migration as part of a
larger household development strategy.
15Migration, Performers, and Non-Performers
Althoughhouseholdsmaybeparticipatinginmigrationtohelpimprovethelivingstandards
of all members, we have not yet determined how migration has affected the placement of
households within the expenditure distribution. In this subsection, we estimate models that
attempt to predict whether or not speciﬁc characteristics have led households to be per-
formers or non-performers. Although these variables are not the same as the expenditure
distribution per se, they speak to where households participating in migration ended up in
the income distribution in 1997. Since we know that the migration variable is endogenous,
we use an instrumental variable estimator developed by Newey. Finally, we run the regres-
sions on both the entire sample and on the subsample of households that fell below the 1992
poverty line calculated by the World Bank, to understand whether or not poor households
were affected differently.
We ﬁnd that migration does not affect the probability of a household being a per-
former (Table 6). Although the coefﬁcients are all positive, they are statistically no differ-
ent from zero (row 1). This is true whether we look at the whole sample or the sample of
poor households only. Therefore, it seems that the fastest growing households in the sam-
ple did not turn to migration to fuel their growth. Other characteristics that affect whether
or not a household is a performer are sensible; for example, the more working age men
live in a household, the higher the probability that the household grew faster than 11% per
year. Larger households and households with more land were also less likely to grow their
consumption quickly. Households with more working age men were able to grow faster
because they have more access to off-farm work, making them better off, whereas house-
holds that have either specialized in grain production or have more of their labor allocated
to grain production are less likely to have grown quickly, because returns to labor in other
activities are often much higher.
Migration has a negative, statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability that a
household is a non-performer (Table 7). The coefﬁcient is somewhat difﬁcult to inter-
pret, because the distribution changes a great deal as an additional migrant is added to the
16household (row 1); however, if we use the standard deﬁnition, the slope of the distribution
at the mean implies that an additional migrant would decrease the probability of a house-
hold being a non-performer by 39%, ceteris paribus. Households that have been able to
send out seasonal migrants are far more likely to have growth rates that were above the
25th percentile of the distribution than households that were not. This ﬁnding holds for
the subsample of poor households; conditional on a household having been poor in 1992,
they were signiﬁcantly less likely to have experienced stagnant growth if they have begun
to send out migrants.
Combined, the results of this exercise show that households that have begun to par-
ticipate in migration have experienced faster growth than other households, ceteris paribus.
Although migrant households are not any more likely to have experienced extremely rapid
growth during the study period than non-migrant households, we ﬁnd that they are much
less likely to have stagnated. The latter ﬁnding is true whether or not households were be-
low the poverty line in 1992-3. Households may be taking advantage of migration to limit
income and therefore consumption risk, as the covariance of migrant earnings and agricul-
tural earnings should be weak. The second effect we are likely seeing is that migrants are
able to take advantage of higher seasonal wages away from the farm, conditional on having
information about these jobs through networks.
Poverty, Inequality, and Migration
To explore the effects of migration on household expenditures from an alternative perspec-
tive, we calculated counterfactual expenditure levels for 1997, by subtracting the effects of
migration from household expenditure growth rates. We use our lowest estimated effect
of migration on expenditure growth, or 4.8%, to be conservative. We tried subtracting the
effect from both the actual growth rates as well as predicted growth rates, and found similar
results, so here we report statistics calculated when we subtract the effect of migration from
the predicted growth rate.
We ﬁnd that although only 10% of households sent out migrants in 1997, the poverty
17rate would have been signiﬁcantly higher had migration not occurred. Whereas the poverty
headcount was 39.2% in 1997, we ﬁnd that 42.3% of households would have fallen below
the poverty line if migration hadstagnated at 1992 levels. Combined with our above results,
wecanconcludethatmigrationnotonlyhelpedkeephouseholdsfromstagnating, butitalso
helped some households escape poverty.
Inequality measures did not change much due to migration, because relatively few
households participated in migration. We ﬁnd that although the actual expenditure Gini
was 28.0, had migration not occurred it would have been 27.5. Other inequality measures
give similar results, except for the 90-10 expenditure ratio, which only changed from 3.35
to 3.34.11 Therefore migration contributed somewhat to inequality around the middle of the
distribution, but not to the tails. If migration has increased dramatically since the 1997-8
survey, it would be useful to understand whether or not migration has continued to increase
rural inequality.
Conclusion
Vietnam’s rapid economic growth since the beginning of Doi Moi has led to strong, rapid
economicgrowth. Inthispaper, weexplorehowthatgrowthhasspreadmicroeconomically.
Between 1992 and 1997, the mean growth rate of household per capita expenditures in
rural Vietnam was 5.8%. However, some households beneﬁted much more from economic
growth than others, as many households saw their expenditures stagnate.
We show that households that have begun to send out seasonal migrants have bene-
ﬁted more from transition than those that have not, other things equal. Whereas migration
participation was quite low in 1992, we ﬁnd that at the household level it had increased
600% by 1997. Our regression results show that once we instrument the migration variable
with a set of variables that measure different types of networks, we ﬁnd that an additional
migrant will increase expenditure growth by between 4.8% and 7.5%, depending upon the
other regressors in the model. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that migrant households were much
less likely to have seen their expenditures stagnate over the period, as they were less likely
18to be categorized as non-performers.
There are several reasons that households may be using migration as part of their
development strategy, all of which fall out of Stark’s theory of migration. It could be that
households want to limit income or consumption risk, though in a growing environment,
this motivation is somewhat less likely, since expectations of the next year’s income should
be higher than present income for most households. These households, conditional on
knowing that jobs are available, may be taking advantage of higher returns to labor to help
the family while their labor is not required on the farm. Unfortunately, we cannot discern
between these motivations in this paper.
Wedoﬁndthatthehouseholdsthathavebeguntoparticipateinmigrationseemtohad
lower incomes than other households in 1992, which implies that encouraging migration
wouldbeasensiblegovernmentpolicytohelpalleviatepoverty. Thereareseveralwaysthat
Vietnam’s government could help encourage the creation of migrant networks. Since the
proportion of the population living in rural areas always declines with economic growth
(Taylor and Martin), Vietnam’s government should assist rural residents in ﬁnding jobs
outside of rural areas, particularly more remote areas. Better roads or transportation links
with areas not currently sending out migrants would help. Two regions stand out in the
data as lagging behind others in migration participation. The Northern Uplands and the
Central Highlands, both minority regions, have much lower than average participation in
migration, as well as lower growth rates. The government could also attempt to educate
people in regions such as these about job possibilities and wages in other areas.
19Notes
1One important question that affects analysis with the VLSS is exactly when the survey took place. Since
the VLSS took place over the course of a calendar year, some households were surveyed about what happened
to them in the ﬁrst year, and some were surveyed more about the second year. Since we difference the data in
much of the analysis in the paper, this difference is unimportant; however, it may cause labeling confusion.
Therefore in the remainder of the paper we will use the years 1992 and 1997 to refer to the two surveys.
2Three further households were dropped from the sample because of incomplete records.
3All currency values in this paper are expressed in 1998 Vietnamese dong. In 1998, the exchange rate was
approximately 13,900 Vietnamese dong to US$1.
4Although the distribution appears normally distributed, we computed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statis-
tic for the null hypothesis that a transformed distribution was a standard normal, and rejected it at the 10%
signiﬁcance level. Therefore we cannot conclude the growth rate distribution is normal.
5Wealsousedalternativedeﬁnitionsofperformersandnon-performers. Forexample, itisequallysensible
to deﬁne non-performers as households that experienced declining expenditures, and performers as an equal
sized group with high expenditure growth. The results are robust to this and other deﬁnitions.
6We choose to analyze seasonal rather than long-term migration for pragmatic reasons; the survey explic-
itly asked about seasonal migration whereas we would have to infer information about permanent migration.
7Of the 65 households participating in migration in 1992, 45 of them no longer send out a migrant in
1997. 353 households increase their migration propensity, so changes in migration behavior take place in
more than 10% of the sample.
8Because we only have two time periods, we will not be able to claim anything about convergence.
9We include descriptive statistics for the included variables in 1992 and 1997 in Appendix Table 1.
10With our base regression, the test statistic distributed χ2(1) is 12.13 when we just use the community
network and 10.25 when we use all of the instruments. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
11The 90-10 expenditure ratio measures the ratio of the 90th percentile of a distribution to the 10th per-
centile. It increased from 3.20 to 3.35 between 1992 and 1997.
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Figure 1: Household Per-Capita Expenditures
24Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Individuals in Rural Vietnam, by Migration Sta-
tus, VLSS, 1997
Migrants Non-Migrants




Years of Education 6.81 5.87
(3.21) (3.65)
Skill Training? (1=yes) 0.103 0.050
(0.304) (0.218)
Married? (1=yes) 0.488 0.620
(0.500) (0.485)
Number of Observations 486 10,360
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source: VLSS.
25Table 2: Selected Differences Between Migrant and Non-Migrant Households, Vietnam
Migrant HHs Other HHs
Median Per-Capita Expenditures 1447 1514
Mean Per-Capita Expenditures 1693 1736
Below Poverty Line 63.1% 56.4%
Mean Expenditure Growth Rate 6.3% 5.7%
Age of Household Head 44.1 45.2
Years of Education, Household Head 6.39 5.50
Household Size 5.38 5.0
Notes: Households characterized as “migrant households” increased their participation in migration
between 1992 and 1997. Therefore, any households either with the same level of participation or
discontinuing participation in migration are categorized as “other” households, which explains the
difference between this table and Table 3.
Source: VLSS.
26Table 3: Selected characteristics of Migrant Households, VLSS, 1992 and 1997
1992 1997
Number of Migrant Households 65 369
Median Expenditures 1264 1437
Median Growth Rates 7.3 5.9
Commune Geography (Proportion of Households with Migrants)
Coastal 5.3% 21.3%
Inland Delta 2.1% 11.2%
Hills/Midlands 0.5% 24.2%
Low Mountains 1.3% 5.6%
High mountains 0.2% 2.4%
Notes: “Median Expenditures” refers to the median household per-capita expenditures. All descrip-
tive statistics are conditional on migration occurring.
Source: VLSS.
27Table 4: Effects of Migration on Household Expenditure Growth, Vietnam
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change in 0.003 0.051 0.055 0.052 0.063 0.011 0.053
Migrants (0.56) (1.56) (1.16) (1.81)* (2.31)** (0.33) (2.30)**
Household Demographics
Women, -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019
aged over 55 (3.92) (3.99) (3.88) (3.98) (4.29) (4.25) (4.31)
Men, -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.009 -0.01
aged over 60 (1.18) (1.44) (1.50) (1.46) (2.37) (2.12) (2.36)
Women, -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019
aged 18-55 (7.58) (7.52) (7.37) (7.58) (7.55) (7.49) (7.67)
Men, -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006
aged 18-60 (1.14) (1.78) (1.69) (1.88) (2.30) (1.29) (2.18)
Children, -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
aged 6-17 (4.20) (3.46) (3.20) (3.49) (4.19) (4.59) (4.36)
Regional Dummies? no no no no yes yes yes
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492
Hansen p-value 0.17 0.38 0.83 0.51
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the commune level. * denotes signiﬁcance at the
10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. All included variables are differenced. The Hansen p-
value reports the p-value for the J statistic that the equation is overidentiﬁed, which is distributed χ2 with
K − 1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number of instruments.
Source: VLSS.
28Table 5: Effects of Migration on Household Expenditure Growth, Vietnam, controlling for
initial expenditures
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Change in 0.048 0.075 0.069
Migrants (2.00)** (2.47)** (2.50)**
Women, 0.004 0.001 0.001
aged over 55 (0.85) (0.17) (0.28)
Men, 0.009 0.007 0.007
aged over 60 (1.88)* (1.59) (1.53)
Women, 0.005 0.002 0.002
aged18-55 (1.84)* (0.79) (0.78)
Men, 0.014 0.008 0.008
aged 18-60 (4.46)** (2.66)** (2.57)**
Children, 0.008 0.003 0.003
aged 6-17 (4.60)** (2.01)** (1.71)*
Change in −0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Av. Ed. Level (0.70) (1.48) (1.52)
Change in Log -0.103 -0.084 -0.082
Household Size (14.81)** (12.22)** (11.85)**
Log Expenditures, -0.074 -0.084
1992 (14.69)** (16.96)**
Commune Avg. 0.041
Log Expenditures, 1992 (2.83)**
Regional Dummies? yes yes yes
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 3492
Hansen p-value 0.41 0.91 0.94
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the commune level. * denotes signiﬁcance at the
10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. All demographic and education variables are differenced.
See Table 4 for notes on the Hansen p-value.
Source: VLSS.
29Table 6: Effects of Migration on Performer Categorization, Vietnam
Explanatory All HHs Poor HHs
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration 0.394 0.069 0.256 −0.097
(1.51) (0.25) (0.75) (0.28)
Household Demographics
Women, aged over 55 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.85) (0.17) (0.28) (0.27)
Men, aged over 60 0.094 0.113 0.016 0.102
(1.18) (1.35) (0.15) (0.93)
Women, aged 18-55 −0.016 −0.014 −0.034 −0.007
(0.38) (0.32) (0.62) (0.13)
Men, aged 18-60 0.160 0.176 0.144 0.183
(3.86)** (4.12)** (2.59)** (3.21)**
Children, aged 6-17 0.045 0.024 0.024 0.012
(1.94)* (0.94) (0.85) (0.40)
Logarithm, Household Size −1.065 −1.171 −1.072 −1.292
(9.82)** (10.30)** (7.40)** (8.26)**
Average Schooling −0.004 −0.004 −0.011 −0.012
(0.45) (0.38) (0.84) (0.91)
Household Head Characteristics
Years of Schooling 0.002 0.019
(0.24) (1.73)*
Age of Head −0.017 −0.032
(1.29) (2.01)**
Age Squared 0.0001 0.00034
(0.80) (1.87)*
Household Endowments, 1992
Logarithm, Land in Annuals −0.034 −0.050
(3.48)** (3.55)**
Own Bicycle? (1=yes) 0.062 0.017
(1.14) (0.32)
Own Motorbike? (1=yes) 0.035 0.614**
(0.27) (2.10)**
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 1993 1993
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signﬁciance at the
5% level. All variables that appear in columns 1 and 3 are changes in the variables; variables that appear in
only columns 2 and 4 are levels in the 1992-3 survey. Regional dummies and some commune characteristics
included in columns 2 and 4, but not reported. Columns (3) and (4) only include households designated
“poor” by the World Bank poverty line in 1992.
Source: VLSS.
30Table 7: Effects of Migration on Non-Performer Categorization, Vietnam
Explanatory All HHs Poor HHs
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration −1.213 −1.060 −0873 −0.681
(3.68)** (3.16)** (1.76)* (1.42)
Household Demographics
Women, aged over 55 −0.014 −0.037 −0.065 −0.090
(0.17) (0.47) (0.55) (0.74)
Men, aged over 60 −0.130 −0.136 −0.141 −0.182
(1.50) (1.53) (1.05) (1.33)
Women, aged 18-55 −0.074 −0.066 −0.108 −0.119
(1.63) (1.44) (1.57) (1.72)*
Men, aged 18-60 −0.229 −0.230 −0.218 −0.236
(4.99)** (4.96)** (3.04)** (3.28)**
Children, aged 6-17 −0.135** −0.127** −0.118 −0.126
(5.38)** (4.77)** (3.47)** (3.47)**
Logarithm, Household Size 1.613 1.612 1.467 1.505
(13.99)** (13.54)** (8.50)** (8.10)**
Avg. Schooling 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.003
(0.01) (0.27) (0.18) (0.19)
Household Head Characteristics
Years of Schooling 0.000 −0.021
(0.05) (1.60)
Age of Head 0.012 0.010
(0.88) (0.54)
Age Squared −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.70) (0.79)
Household Endowments, 1992
Logarithm, Land in Annuals 0.003 0.016
(0.27) (0.84)
Own Bicycle? (1=yes) −0.102 −0.096
(1.80)* (1.17)
Own Motorbike? (1=yes) −0.124
(0.82)
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 1993 1993
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signﬁciance at the
5% level. All variables that appear in columns 1 and 3 are changes in the variables; variables that appear in
only columns 2 and 4 are levels in the 1992-3 survey. Regional dummies and some commune characteristics
included in columns 2 and 4, but not reported. Columns (3) and (4) only include households designated
“poor” by the World Bank poverty line in 1992.
Source: VLSS.
31Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables, VLSS, 1992-3 and 1997-8
Variable 1992-3 1997-8
Per Capita Expenditures 1732 2360
(995) (1452)
Number of Migrants 0.025 0.140
(0.214) (0.461)
Women, aged over 55 0.299 0.343
(0.473) (0.490)
Men, aged over 60 0.169 0.184
(0.375) (0.389)
Women, aged 18-55 1.156 1.140
0.689 0.719
Men, aged 18-60 1.103 1.130
(0.771) (0.724)
Children aged 6-17 1.59 1.56
(1.48) (1.37)
Average Years of 5.58 5.80
Schooling (3.40) (3.13)
Household Size 5.04 4.83
(2.12) (1.94)
Percent born in 0.039 −
Hanoi or HCM City (0.144)
Percent forcibly 0.129 −
relocated (0.207)
Percent commune, 0.033 −
migrating (0.052)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Sample size if 3492.
Source: VLSS.
32Appendix Table 2: Determinants of Change in Migration Behavior, Rural Vietnam, 1992
and 1997
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent Workforce, 1.655 1.623 1.622 1.656 1.633 1.540
Migrants, 1992 (3.38)** (3.30)** (3.30)** (3.41)** (3.34)** (3.06)**
Percent of HH from 0.260 0.228 0.228 0.242 0.239 0.270
Hanoi/HCM City (3.71)** (2.91)** (2.89)** (3.09)** (3.09)** (3.66)**
Percent of HH 0.026 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.029 0.014
Relocated (0.66) (0.85) (0.84) (0.71) (0.85) (0.45)
Household Demographics
Women, 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.018
aged over 55 (0.56) (0.55) (0.57) (0.65) (0.60) (0.61) (0.66)
Men, 0.027 0.03 0.027 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.033
aged over 60 (1.07) (1.20) (1.10) (1.13) (1.11) (1.10) (1.23)
Women, 0.025 0.02 0.026 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029
aged 18-55 (1.91)* 1.45 (1.99)** (1.72)* (1.67)* (1.65)* ( 1.64)
Men, 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.051 0.048 0.047 0.049
aged 18-60 (3.27)** (3.36)** (3.31)** (2.99)** (2.87)** (2.85)** (2.97)**
Children, -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016
aged 6-17 (2.35)** (2.53)** (2.49)** (1.76)* (2.15)** (2.20)** (2.10)**
Logarithm, -0.018 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002
Household Size (0.55) (0.20) (0.12) (0.08)
Other Variables
Change in 0 0 0 0
Avg. Ed. Level (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.09)
Log Expenditures, -0.046 -0.058 -0.058
1992 (2.37)** (2.72)** (2.70)**
Commune Avg. Log 0.042 0.054
Expenditures, 1992 (0.87) (1.26)
Regional dummies? no no no no no no yes
Statistics:
N 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492
p-value, instruments 0.001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; standard errors are corrected for clustering at the commune level.
*-indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level; **- indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level. The
p-value is for the F-test that all included instruments are jointly insigniﬁcant.
Source: VLSS.
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